Deception and Self-Deception: A Unified Account

Deception and Self-Deception: A Unified Account

Author(s): Vladimir Krstić (Author)

• Publisher: Cambridge University Press
• Publication Date: September 4, 2025
• Language: English
• Print length: 80 pages
• ISBN-10: 1009362895
• ISBN-13: 9781009362894

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